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THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION1 
by Tamas Foldesi 
Dr. Tamas Foldesi (Marxist) is the dean and professor of the philosophy of 
law of the Law School, Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary. This paper 
was delivered as the main Marxist paper at the Second International Conference on 
Ways to Promote the 198 1 U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, "Building Understanding 
and Respect between People of Diverse Religions or Beliefs," Warsaw, Poland, May 
15, 1989. This edited version of that speech is printed with Prof. Foldesi's 
permission. A previous article of his was published in OPREE, Vol. 9, No. I. He has 
written many books and articles and may be regarded as one of the most prominent 
humanist Marxist thinkers in the area of human rights. 
I. 
The Limitation of the Freedom of Religion and Its Ideology 
I published a book on human rights in Hungary in January 1989. The basic conclusion 
of the book was that the implementation of human rights in Eastern Europe has been 
characterized by fundamental contradictions and discrepancies during the long historic period 
dominated by a one-party system, especially in the sphere of the so-called "rights to political 
freedom." The main contradiction is this: On the one hand, human rights in these countries 
have been declared basic values which form an integral part of the constitution and the actual 
exercise of human rights is officially evaluated as- being basically (and increasingly) in 
harmony with the declared principles. On the other hand, as a necessary consequence of the 
single-party system, the political part of human rights--the rights of association, assembly, 
speech, press, and others--are strictly limited, and, in fact, are not being implemented. 
In this paper I wish to explore whether the large-scale limitation of human rights had 
affected the freedom of conscience and religion, and if so, to what extent. In addition, I will 
also review the ideological justifications of the limitation of the rights of conscience and 
religion and which are its debatable, and for me, unacceptable propositions. The analysis is 
1 A shortened version of the author's study published under the same title. 
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primarily done on the basis of the Hur:tgarian experiences with an occasional look at the 
developments in other East European countries. 
In relation to the rights of conscience and religion can one trace the duality that 
characterized the general situation of human rights in Eastern Europe? One side of the 
above contradiction evidently exists: similarly to all other human rights, the rights of 
conscience and religion are among the declared basic values listed in constitutions (although 
not all of the human rights listed in the 1948 and 1966 U.N. Human Rights Declarations are 
included in the East European constitutions). In regard to their implementation the answer 
given was definitely positive. This attitude was typically characterized by the positions 
adopted by the congresses of the Hungarian Socialist.Worker's Party [the Communist Party 
of Hungary] which were repeated almost as stereotypes after 1956, declaring that in Hungary 
the right to religion was fully implemented, that relations between the state and the churches 
were reliably settled, and that the· churches operated in an autonomous manner. 2 
With regard to the other side of the contradiction, at first glance it seems the question has 
to be answered negatively. Since no other real political parties could exist under the 
conditions of the one-party system, they, as a consequence, could not have their own press, 
and so forth. In Eastern Europe (except in Albania) different churches did exist legally, and 
they did have the right to hold religious festivities and to publish books and newspapers 
within certain limits. In contrast to the 1950s--at least in Hungary--the citizens could freely 
attend religious ceremonies without suffering disadvantages; for instance, their children could 
attend religious educational courses. 
However, the situation is different when the realization of the freedom of conscience and 
religion is evaluated within the framework of human rights as a whole. It is a part, an 
integral part of human rights--as the essence of the right of equality and freedom--that the 
system of political institutions should provide an opportunity for different social movements 
to forin organizations, to express their ideas, ideologies, and should not hinder the creation 
of realistic competition among them. Only so can citizens be ensured that by studying 
different ideas, views, and trends, they can decide for themselves which political concepts 
and organizations they may want to support, what ideologies, philosophical and ethical 
concepts they want to accept or reject. In other words, human rights definitely include a 
relative equality of chances, for only then can human rights fulfil their basic function that 
individuals within a society may extend their personality. Only when they know the 
alternatives can they select from among the different political, ideological, and other values. 
However, this equality of chances did not really exist in countries of Eastern Europe. 
2See. the congressional reports of the 9th, lOth, lith, 12th, 13th Congresses of the Hungarian 
Socialist Worker's Party between 1967 and ·1985. · 
2 
Although the churches could operate and religion could exist in a legal manner their 
opportunities were severely limited. 
An overall characteristics of the limitations of the freedom of conscience and religion was 
that from the second half of the 1940s, in the majority of the East European countries, a 
system of conditions was established where the activity of the churches was actually forced 
into a narrowly set framework very different from the opportunities available for the spread 
of the Marxist ideology. The opportunities were first limited when the East European 
political systems were turned from a pluralistic to a monolithic form where the vast majority 
of the organizations that did not form the so-called "transmission belts" of the ruling 
communist parties were eliminated or else their operation was reduced to a formality. 
Religious clubs and associations, including their youth sections, were eliminated during that 
period and they could not be reorganized for decades. This included, in Hungary, the 
abolishment of the monastic orders (Law No. 34/1950), and only a few of the schools owned 
and operated by the churches were allowed to carry on their activities. 
On the level of education the most characteristic example of the inequality of chances 
was in schools. Especially in secondary schools and institutions of higher education (with the 
exception of church-run secondary schools and theological schools), education is carried out 
strictly in the atheist spirit; the curricular materials in the social sciences are based on 
Marxism, and classes in Marxism are obligatory at colleges and universities. 
The limitation of the right to religion is also expressed in Hungary and the majority of 
the East European countries by the fact that up to very recently the means of mass 
communications were available to the Churches only to an extremely limited extent. This 
practice ·evidently expressed the concept that the spread of religious ideas through such 
channels was not desired. 
The significant limitation of religious activities was also expressed by the fact that the 
autonomy of the churches was far more relative than what could be considered compatible 
with the freedom of religion. However, the majority of the East European countries have 
implemented legal regulations that considerably obscure autonomy, expressing a monolithic 
attitude that all organizations that do not serve the expression of the policy pursued by the 
Communist Parties--except for sports organizations--should not be trusted. The churches 
are obligated to inform the State Office for Church Affairs of all their more significant 
actions, plans, and ideas. In its own right the State Office for Church Affairs has a say in 
the appointment of Church dignitaries, and it often makes its own suggestions. Far from 
being complete, this list clearly s·hows that this is not a case of occasional, incidental 
limitation of the right of religion but a phenomenon that can be observed on a wide scale. 
The basic reason for the different implementation of the rights of conscience and religion 
is that a monolithic political structure only considers its own ideology--the spread of 
3 
Marxism-Leninism--to be an indispensable means of social development, presuming that this 
was identical to the objective interests of the people, especially of the future generations. 
In this respect, in principle, the churches and religions are in the same category as the 
organizations and ·their ideologies which maintain platforms different from those of the 
ruling party. They are both unwanted competitors. Their activities should be limited or 
banned in the interest of mafiitaining power, since their ideas objectively--and occasionally 
subjectively, too--represent (or may represent) trends which differ from socialism. 
However, the significant difference is that while a monolithic structure--despite several, 
already explained negative consequences even during a longer historic period--may allow 
itself to govern without competitors, it cannot take the same route toward the churches and 
denominations. Due to historic reasons and traditions the social requirements and needs of 
people expres�ed in their religions must be tolerated to a certain extent. 
Therefore, the churches and religions appear as a "necessary evil" in the monolithic East 
European systems. However, ''necessary evil" is a deeply and basically contradictory category. 
Simultaneously it recognizes the necessity of a group· of phenomena which "unfortunately" 
cannot be eliminated or eradicated from amongst general social phenomena, but at the same 
time their social role should be completely or partly obstructed. 
The objective contradiction has a two-way effect. On the one hand if something is evil, 
its activities or opportunities should be limited. One must change the necessary into 
unnecessary. "Ne
.
cessary . evil" is not very different from "unnecessary evil." The idea of 
"unnecessary evil" affects not only all the churches and religions as complex phenomena (as 
in the case of Albania) but "only" some of its organs, (e.g. the abolishment of the monastic 
orders, and associations). On the other hand, if the churches and religions are necessary-­
taking social-historic realities into consideration--endeavors are made to use, as much as 
possible, the churches and religions in the interest of the system. This is the root of the 
endeavors to establish certain forms of political cooperation, which in some countries may 
even reach a stage of alliance and may be extended to cooperation to handle certain negative 
phenomena of society (such as the struggle against social maladjustment) or to the support 
of dialogues (although dialogues reflect a somewhat ·different mentality on behalf of 
Marxism). 
All this is historically further complicated by the fact that the churches and religions-­
although their social-historic role was very diverse and contradictory--were closely related 
both financially and intellectually to the bourgeois societies, and therefore, during the social 
changes that took place in Eastern Europe following the Second World War, there was a 
significant conflict of interests between the new social order and at least a part of the 
churches and religions in connection with their earlier status and position (for example, the 
problems of the hind distribution). Similarly, in the majority of the East European countries, 
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with the exception of Czechoslovakia, bourgeois· democracy only had a minor influence. 
Several feudal remnants still existed (despite the bourgeois requirements) and, as a result, the 
state and the churches were not separated consistently. Consequently, the freedom of 
religion and conscience was implemented to a limited degree. (Merely two examples: Before 
World War II, only in Czechoslovakia was it possible for someone to declare himself/herself 
not belonging to any Church or religion without most serious social consequences. Another 
characteristic example was in Hungary, for instance, where prior to World War II church 
taxes were collected as public taxes and one had to belong to a church or denomination.) 
To consider religions and Churches as a "necessary evil" brings about a similar collision 
of values as in the case of. "rights to political freedom." In my book, I endeavored to 
document that classic political human rights--within the framework of a dogmatic concept­
-conflicts with the maintenance of power and the building of monolithically conceived 
socialism. The "solution" of the presumed collision is that the maintenance of power, the 
"building of socialism" is a more important interest than are the classic political human rights. 
This legitimated their long- lasting limitation well beyond the periods of the cult of 
personality. 
In the case of the freedom of conscience and religion the contradiction is between this 
groups of human rights and the general Marxist-Leninist ideology which would have to be 
accepted by practically all. The latter is considered politically to be a basic ideological 
condition for the completion of socialist construction. There is no doubt that within the 
framework of a monolithic concept the freedom of religion and conscience must, relatively, 
succumb in a conflict of values. If the limitation of the freedom of religion and conscience 
is the price to be paid for the increasingly successful and wide-ranging spread of the Marxist 
ideology, this sacrifice is worth the effort even if, in a similar manner to the limitation of 
the "political human rights," it provides a platform for criticisms of various types and 
motivations, since it results in a contradiction between the declared principles and the actual 
practice. 
So far we have studied the political motivations of the partial limitation of the freedom 
of religion and conscience. However, limitations have not only political sources but 
ideological roots as well. In Eastern Europe the Marxist ideology dealing with the criticism 
of religion provided a theoretical basis for the foundation of such limitation. However, in 
this respect, at least in Hungary, there was a significant difference between the views of two 
groups of critics. The first groups of the Marxist critics of religion continued, in somewhat 
refined form, the simplistic concepts about church and religion which were formulated in 
the 1950s. The members of this group agreed with such limitations and aimed at the 
· conscious ideological foundation for the continued necessity of religion. Nevertheless, there 
was also a more progressive trend whose members endeavored to elaborate a more nuanced 
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picture in order to create a theoretical basis for practical cooperation that, based on 
agreements between the state and the churches, were gradually implemented in policy and 
several areas of everyday life. The activity of the second trend created the preconditions for 
the organization of dialogues. As of the 1980s some significant dialogues took place. At the 
same time one must add that the representatives of this group also considered the limitation 
of the freedom of religion and the· struggle against religion to be necessary, but they placed 
a far greater emphasis on political cooperation and dialogue with the churches. 
The representatives of the more conservative criticism of religion in essence based their 
concept concerning the justification of the limitation of religious freedom on three 
ar·guments. However, one must note that the actual fact of limitation has never been 
acknowledged by either group of the Marxist critics of religion, but the logical consequence 
of their reasoning reflected a trend leading towards limitation. 
The first basis is the evaluation of the truth content of religious teachings saying that in 
a peculiar way they considerably deter people from reality. The result was that religion is· 
considered a false consciousness strongly contradicting !;ciences which reflect reality in a true 
manner. But they meant not only the sciences. Marxism, as the "sole scientific ideology," 
was declared to be a specific branch of science. The conclusion of the two combined was 
that in education, science must be given .. a "green light," and Marxism, as a scientific 
ideology, should be given priority, so much so, that, as far as possible, it must be ensured a 
monopoly situation. Religious views, however, should be excluded from the classrooms and 
education. At best religion is to be the subject of criticism in classroom. (Its fate should be 
analogous to those pseudo-sciences that should be eliminated from the curricula as much as 
possible.) 
The "objective" contradiction between the "falseness" of religion and the "truth" of 
Marxism is the basis of the so-called ideological class struggle, which--despite their similar 
features--significantly differs from the economic and political forms of class struggle. In the 
case of the latter two there may also be an identity of interests in addition to the conflict of 
interests, which enables economic and political coexistence. But truth and fallacy rule out 
one. another. Therefore, both coexistence and convergence are impossible on the "ideological 
front." According to Pal Foldi "the relationship between science and religion is 
irreconcilable," and in essence the same holds true for Marxism-Leninism. "The party is a 
vanguard; its ideology is Marxist-Leninism which contradicts all sorts of bourgeois, petit­
bourgeois, religious ideologies."3 
3Pal Foldi, Egyhaspolitika es vallaskritika [Religious Policy and the Criticism of Religion] 
(Budapest: Kossuth Publishing House, 1975), pp. 47 and 6. 
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The second basis for the limitation of the rights of conscience and religion was the 
unilateral evaluation of the social-historic role olayed by religion which is closely related to 
the first root. If religious views were the specific appearance of false consciousness and at 
the same time the most significant obstacles to the spread of Marxism-Leninism as the real 
ideology, their social role must necessarily be reactionary. conservative. In the case of the 
dogmatic evaluation of religion the reactionary nature of religion is based historically. The 
theoretical starting point is the role played by religion in class society, which is 
unambiguously negative, according to this evaluation. 
A basic feature of the dogmatic concept is that this simplified historical evaluation is 
transferred, almost as is, to the present-day conditions. The class content of religion 
generally does not change under the conditions of "socialism," under the presumptions that 
Marxism-Leninism remains the ideology· of the most progressive social class, the working 
class (it may be extended to that of "the people"), necessarily opposing religion which reflects 
petit-bourgeois attitudes. "The religious ideology is incompatible with the socialist ideology; 
they stem from different roots. So much so that the gap even widens(!!)" 
Similarly "in socialism religious morals are just as unacceptable as the bourgeois, petit­
bourgeois morals."4 From all of this the conclusion is evident: "The interest and task of man 
building socialist, communist society is to get rid of the shackles of religion." 
The third reasoning is based on the alleged practice of "socialism" which ,according to 
this supposition, fully proves the validity of policy of the restriction of the freedom of 
religion. According to the representatives of the dogmatic criticism of religion "socialist 
consciousness" and the "trend of influence" of the individual religions reflect a contrasting 
change. While the first gradually strengthens, the second permanently fades in a proportional 
manner. The reasons for the contrasting phenomenon--since this is a special reflection-­
are considered to be that "socialism" provides an ever increasing opportunity for human self­
attainment. They believe that it is increasingly proven that the "liberated human being" is 
capable of directing his or her society and himself or herself, and therefore, will decreasingly 
rely on the "crutches of religion." Again, according to Pal Foldi, "with the leadership of the 
working class and our society's political unity, concord is constantly strengthened" and 
simultaneously with it "socialist consciousness" is implemented on an increasingly wide scale. 
As a counterpoint "religion becomes gradually groundless and will fade away in the socialist 
society."5 
4Ibid., pp. 6, 7, and 56. 
5Ibid., pp. 6, 8, 40, and 56. The length of this short study makes it impossible to deal in detail 
with the views of the Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Soviet, and other authors who discuss, practically 
in the same spirit, the question of truth-content of religion and Marxist ideas, the social role of 
religions, the strengthening of "the socialist consciousness" and the weakening of religion. Therefore, 
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The more progressive Hungarian critics of religion represent a far more varied stand on 
these issues. This concept may generally be characterized by the inclusion of both of the 
previous elements in a partial form as well as realistic features that stand far closer to the 
truth. By way of illustration let us quote a few thoughts by Jozsef Lukacs, who was a 
leading proponent of the progressive criticism of religion. 
In the works of J6zsef Lukacs one can find the idea that "religions may be differentiated 
from plain mistakes by the role they play in promoting the development of historic necessity 
and social development".6 At the same time, elsewhere he refines this concept by s�ating that 
in certain respects religion also includes correct views. 7 
. 
In another work he already 
differentiates between religious views and religious ideology. While on the level of views he 
considers religions and Marxism incompatible, with regard to ideologies he states that they 
do not rule out one another in all aspects and even lists those very important features, from 
the preservation of peace to honesty and loyalty, which converge. 8 
The difference between the progressive and regressive criticisms of religion is further 
emphasized in the evaluation of the social role played by religions. This is primarily 
expressed in that, according to J. Lukacs, the progressive and revolutionary endeavors may · 
also appear in religions; they may inspire cultural development.9 In harmony with this he 
emphasized the alliance of the churches and the state, especially in regard to political and 
cultural issues. 
However, the remnants of the dogmatic concept also appear here. In this spirit J. Lukacs 
writes that the religions in the countries of Eastern Europe have a bourgeois, petit-bourgeois 
content, and the "class struggle presumes a break with religion" although the extent of that 
here I will only list a few works: Sandor Urban, Egyhaz es allam [Church and State], (Budapest: 
Kossuth Publishers, 1962.); Y. Yaroslavsky: A kommunistak es a vallas [The Communists and 
Religion], (Budapest: Kossuth Publishers, 1965); I. A. Galiczkaja: Gondolatok a vallasr6l [Thoughts 
About Religion] (Budapest: Kossuth Publishers, 1964); J. Koszely, A modern egyhaz es a vallas [The 
Modern Church and Religion], (Budapest: Kossuth Publishers, 1975); J. Kanskiy: Erkolcs es vallas 
[Morals and Religion], (Bratislava, 1962).  
61. Lukacs, Tortenelem. filoz6fia. vallasossag [History, Philosophy, Religion]. (Budapest: Gondolat 
Publishers, 1979), p. 92. 
7Ibid., p. 302. 
81. Lukacs: Eszmek es valasztasok [Notions and Choices], (Budapest: Gondolat Publishers, 1988), 
p. 285. 
9Ibid., pp. 280-28 1 .  
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breakaway varied historically. 
supplementation. nlO 
In addition, "socialism did not require religious 
With regard to the situation and future of religion in the countries of Eastern Europe, 
according to the more progressive criticisms of religion, as a result of the alienation 
experienced in "socialism," religion will continue to play an important role and maintain its 
influence for a longer period of time. The representatives of this view also agree that with 
the progress of the "construction of ·socialism" the social bases of religion decrease. 
According to J. Lukacs "the conclusive evidence against religion is provided by history."11 
However, more important is that in conclusion even the more progressive criticisms of 
religion evaluate the relations between the state and the churches, and Marxism and religion, 
from a position of power. In this spirit there is a basic agreement among its proponents that 
the freedom of religion is sufficiently implemented and that the relations between the state 
and the Churches are satisfactorily settled.12 
II 
The Concept Requiring the Elimination of the Freedom 
of Conscience and Religion 
I think it has been already made clear that my standpoint differs on a number of issues, 
not only from the dogmatic concept of the criticism of religion, but even from the more 
progressive Marxist theories on religion. Primarily, I maintain that similarly to all other 
human rights, in all of their complexity, the consistent implementation of the rights of 
10J. Lukacs, Tortenelem. filoz6fia. vallasossag, pp. 259 and 262. 
11Ibid., p. 305. 
12In my longer study on the rights of religion a�d conscience I have analyzed in detail the 
theoretical roots of the above described concepts. The roots include the views expressed by the 
classics of Marxism, their strongly anti-religious stand, although one can also show that the dogmatic 
critics of religion have significantly simplified the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin on religion. 
Among the roots the enlightenment of the Age of Enlightenment also played a role which continues 
even today along with the concepts and practice of the Soviet Union and other East European 
countries concerning the churches and religion. These cannot be discussed here in detail because of 
the lack of space. 
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freedom of conscience and religion is one of the basic tasks of the near future. I do not 
agree that ·the situation in regard to the freedom of conscience and religion was satisfactory 
in Hungary although I do not reject the partial results and relative successes, especially when 
compared to certain other countries of Eastern Europe. The relatively good relationship 
between the state and the ·churches, the "settled" nature of the situation cannot hide that this 
is not a relationship of equal parties who mutually promote their interests, but one reflecting 
an unequal power relationship and a monolithic attitude that require correction in the spirit 
of the consistent implementation of human rights. 
Furthermore, while I primarily disagree with the reasoning of the d.ogmatic criticism of 
religion, I also disagree with the similar views of the more progressive concept of the 
criticism of religion. My counter-argument is as follows: 
I think that the coupling of religions with false consciousness and contrasting it ·with 
Marxism as the scientific truth is basically questionable. The comparison of the values of the 
religious ideologies and those of the Marxist ideology presumes the reliable disclosure of the 
truth values of these concepts. 
· But can one· unequivocally determine the truth value of the contrasting ideological 
statements and concepts? Has it really been unequivocally decided and proven that God does 
. 
. 
not exist, that the world is eternal and endless? I think that so fa:r we have not been able to 
find an answer to this cardinal problem of the contradictory ideologies that would have been 
logically oroven in an exact scientific manner or whose antithesis had been rejected. 
The more progressive critics of religion within Marxism endeavored to overcome this 
wh�le complex of problems by a specific shifting of the emphasis, justly emphasizing that 
the essence of Marxism was not atheism, but the human being and social philosophy, and that 
the seed of atheism was not negation but a benevolent humanistic ideology. 
In my view this is the only possible route for Marxism. At the same time this evaluation 
of atheism is a special retreat in this sphere. The collision of the religious concept and the 
Marxist ideas does not primarily concern the belief in God and atheism but has transferred 
to the sphere of ideology, to. the fields of society, human concerns, and ethics.13 
However, if atheism, even in a reduced way, remains a part of Marxism it must be 
acknowledged that the Marxist concepts concerning atheism do not oppose the partially or 
completely unscientific nature of religious belief because they are scientific, but, in the best 
case, as a probable (perhaps of a greater level of probability) hypothesis opposed to another 
assumption. In this sense the real gap or cleavage is not between "science and atheism" and 
"unscientific religious belief," but between the sciences (especially natural sciences) and the 
13It is not a coincidence that due to this several West European and South American Communist 
Parties consider party membership and religious belief compatible. 
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philosophical approaches, the latter of which include both the materialist and idealist 
(theological) approaches.14 
As a result, the justification or legitimation of either the religious or the Marxist 
ideologies are not decided by their seemingly undeterminable truth content, but that they 
fulfil determined social needs and that they are a source of motivation for actions and for 
taking a stand. It is a self -conceit by Marxism to state that the relationship between the two 
ideologies is basically ·characterized by the dichotomy of true and false. 
The concept of the limitation of religious freedom is even more questionable if one adds 
to the study the ideological sohere mentioned by J6zsef Lukacs. According to Lukacs's 
terminology, ideologies, in contrast to. world outlook, "do not rule out one another in all 
respects." 
But if one takes a look at the issues where similarities in essential points of contact are 
found it turns out that these are not only quantitatively numerous but are also qualitatively 
basic issues. Peace, truth, equality, love, consistent humanitarianism, respect for the 
community, honesty, loyalty, the enrichment of the personality, and so forth form value 
complexes that raise basic doubts concerning the notion of complete or essential ideological 
opposition. Especially when one takes into consideration that the social attitudes of a 
significant portion of the churches in Eastern Europe gradually changed since the 1950s, the 
elements (the questioning of revolution, the protection of private ownership) which 
significantly differentiated religious ideologies from Marxism were forced in the background. 
All this does not mean that as a result of the opposing ideological foundations significant 
differences do not continue to exist. However, it may confidently be stated that if 
ideological discrepancies do not provide a sufficient justification for limiting the freedom 
of religion, other ideological differences, which contain a number of significant similarities 
and points of contact, should also not be used as a basis to justify such restrictions. 
In the light of all this, the justification which utilizes the notion of the ideological class 
struggle proves to be untenable. If the ideological class struggle's lack of compromise and 
rejection of coexistence were based on the presumed incompatibility of "Weltanschauung" 
(world outlook) and ideology and on an almost absolute opposition, another understanding 
of the world outlook and ideologies must lead to a different conclusion when the premises 
are changed. 
If the ideological poles only embody different scales of probability, if a wide scale of 
ideologies are provided for diverging and converging elements, one is justified to ask why 
14 As a result I do not agree with the ideas of Marx or Lenin when they identify religious 
teachings with superstition and obscurantism, because they do not correspond to reality. 
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should the at least partial cooperation and coexistence based on a dialogue be rejected in this 
field when it has already been accepted in the economic and political fields. 
As I have pointed out in another paper, the sharp differentiation between the norms of 
the ideological class struggle and the rul�s of economic and political class struggle is 
unfounded because coexistence acknowledged in the field of politics is based on values (such 
as, for instance, the positive valuation of peace and truth) which have roots in ideology. 
Thus, if the premise were true that ideologies are merely characterized by opposition, there 
would be a lack of intellectual ammunition required by political cooperation.15 The French 
Marxist, M. Werret, is profoundly correct in writing that a Marxist would make himself or 
herself poor if he or she were to isolate himself or herself from other cultural trends. "The 
Marxist who thinks he has nothing to learn from Mauriac, Chagall, Fellini with regard to 
man understands nothing of man, Christianity or Mar�ism."16 In addition, one is justified 
to raise the question whether under the social conditions in the countries of Eastern Europe 
it is realistic at all to presume the existence of a class struggle when the contradicting classes 
had been eliminated decades ago and that sociological researchers have even questioned the 
notion of the existence of classes that do not oppose o�e another. 
Even the views. concerning the social function of religions and the churches failed to 
provide a sufficient basis for restricting the freedom of religion. In my view the concept 
expressed by the followers of the dogmatic criticis� of religion about the historic role played 
by the churches and religions are tendentious and one-sided. I do not wish to deal here with 
the notions concerning the past of religions and the churches since those cannot in fact 
influence the judgments concerning the present. The only real reason for the restriction of 
the freedom of religion could only be the current role played by.religions and the churches 
and not their presumed reactionary activities in the past.17 As far as the present is 
concerned, I basically doubt the statement that the churches and religions are at best tolerated 
companions whose social views and ethics are of a petit-bourgeois and/or bourgeois class 
c_ontent and thus, in essence, retrogressive. 
15Tamas Foldesi, "Bizhatnak e a vitapartnerek egymasban? Gondolatok a dialogusr61." [Can 
Partners in Debate Trust One Another? Thoughts About Dialogue], Vilagossag, (Budapest) No. 
1/1987. pp. 24-30. 
. 
16M. Werret, A munkaspartok es a vallas [The Labor Parties and Religion]. (Budapest: Gondolat 
Publishers, 1967). 
17I think that the far more nuanced Marxist evaluations and analyses by the followers of the more 
progressive criticism of religion provide a sufficient answer as to why the historic activities of the 
churches and religions should not be viewed as only conservative. 
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However, it is indispensable for . the support of the foregoing statement to include the 
third element which serves as the theoretical basis of the restrictions of religion, namely, the 
criticism of its unrealistic evaluation of society. The criticism of the picture of the illusory 
nature of religion which was drawn· by the dogmatic critics of religion may provide a real 
basis for an endeavor to more realistically evaluate the social function of churches and 
religions. 
The repeated social crises in .the East European countries which reflect the basically 
unsolved theoretical and practical problems of the economy, politics and public and private 
morals, clearly prove that the presumption concerning the constant strengthening of the so­
called "socialist consciousness" and the chronic weakening of religious influence (including 
the moral spheres of this same issue) is in itself illusory and false. Recently it has become 
increasingly clear that despite certain partial. successes, the ruling ideas in Eastern Europe 
(partly differing from one another) concerning socialism, such as the work of socialist 
construction and even the stages, criteria, and tasks of the transition to communism, have 
become problematic and que�tionable. They require a basic re-evaluation. 
In connection with this, the. consciousness of most people is far from being socialist. One 
should add here that the very criteria of the so-called "socialist consciousness" also requires 
re-examination as to whether there was a need for such a category at all. In contrast to this, 
according to the results of polls conducted in Hungary, despite the many restrictions the 
churches and. religions have not only maintained their influence but even increased it. This 
is true although contradictory processes are· going on in this sphere. As a result of 
secularization and for other reasons as well the number of deeply religious people have been 
decreasing. (This is an international phenomenon, at least in Europe.) 
However, the above does mean that the questionable basis of the restrictions of the 
freedom of religion has been lost as a justification for these limitation which gave priority 
to the development of socialis.m and the spread of "socialist consciousness." 
If the further development of the East European societies were to continue in the spirit 
of setting considerably new aims which include the basic role of democratic socialism or 
democracy, humanism, justice, community spirit, and other traditional humanistic values, as 
well as the aim of overcoming negative s.ocial phenomena, including those of the disturbances 
resulting from social adaptation, then a significant role in their implementation is to be 
played by the different religions and Churches, especially the larger ones. Not primarily 
because of the principle, "if they could not be eliminated they should cooperate with us" 
which was proclaime9 as the official policy thus far, but decidedly because these tasks, 
which can be realized only with great. difficulty, require a wide-ranging social cooperation 
which cannot be implemented without the assistance of the churches and religions. All this 
is basically underscored by the fact that, on the one hand, these aims coincide, approach or 
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touch upon the modern church and religious concepts on several points, while, on the other 
hand, in a consistently democratic society it is an indispensable part of human rights that the 
churches and religions should also have an unlimited opportunity to implement their social 
and moral ideas. 
In the light of all this, the statement seems untenable that (socialist) social progress is 
diagonally contradictory to the growth of the church or religious influence since in their 
content the two are contrary and, therefore, they may only develop to the detriment of one 
another. Placing the contradiction between a religious world outlook or ideology and 
Marxism on a class basis is also unacceptable and anachronistic to a great extent. 
If, however, the arguments of the dogmatic criticism of religion fail, there is even less 
reason for the limitation of religious freedom based upon the far more realistic views 
represented by the more progressive Marxist criticism of religion.· 
However, this must lead to an unlimited implementation of human rights. In my paper 
on human rights I reached the conclusion that a consistently. democratic, humanistic society 
based on social equality and freedom (or at least leading in that direction) indispensably 
requires--depending on the social conditions--the widest possible implementation of human 
rights as its political, legal and moral basis·. Human rights, such as life worthy of the human 
being, basic values required for the unfolding of the human personality, and the maintenance 
of human dignity form an integral whole. The conscious violation of limitation of any one 
will have serious consequences on the others and especially on the related groups. The basic 
renewal of the East European societies, the democratic transformation of their political 
system of institutions may only become a reality through the consistent implementation of 
the political rights of freedom. And an integral part of that is the right of conscience and 
religion. 
An indispensable element of the political rights of freedom is pluralism which is 
expressed in the manifold level and character of the different institutions and systems of 
ideas. The implementation of pluralism requires not only its formal declaration, but also the 
equality of chances. The same must hold true for the right of conscience and religion: the 
creation of equal opportunity and the elimination of the monopoly situation is indispensable. 
The implementation of all this in Eastern Europe is a separate problem which is not easily 
solved, since the effects of the restrictions which were introduced during the past decades 
cannot be eliminated from one day to the next. However, the clarification and further 
discussion of these .Questions of principle are mandatory for the success of their 
implementation. 
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